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CROSSING THE RUBICON:
THE NETHERLANDS’ STEADY MARCH
TOWARDS INVOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
I. INTRODUCTION

I

n December of 2004, administrators at a Dutch hospital announced a
new policy that would allow pediatricians to kill severely handicapped newborn infants.1 In early 2005, the Royal Dutch Medical Association revealed that it had asked the government to propose new rules to
facilitate the killing of “disabled children, the severely mentally retarded
and patients in irreversible comas.”2 To foreign observers who have not
been following developments in the Netherlands, these news stories may
have seemed shocking. Modern, liberal democracies are supposed to protect the mentally challenged and physically handicapped, not kill them.
For those who have been paying attention, however, these latest news
reports merely represent the next logical step3 in the Netherlands’ quixotic attempt to regulate euthanasia.4
The Netherlands became the first country in modern history to formally decriminalize euthanasia, the controversial practice in which a
physician terminates the life of a patient upon the patient’s request.5 The
1. Michael Horsnell, Netherlands Hospital Started to Kill Terminally Ill and Severely Disabled Babies with the Consent of their Parents, TIMES LONDON, Dec. 4, 2004,
at 13. The administrators at Groningen Academic Hospital in the Netherlands have issued
procedural guidelines to guide physicians as they provide euthanasia to infants. Id. The
clinical guidelines are not yet available in English.
2. The Dutch Ponder “Mercy Killing” Rules, CNN.com, Dec. 1, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/12/01/netherlands.mercykill/index.html.
3. Ian Traynor, Secret Killings of Newborn Babies Traps Dutch Doctors in Moral
Maze: Call for New Rules to End Dilemma for Medical and Legal Professions,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 21, 2004, at 3 (“From the point of view of the Netherlands, this debate
about newborns is a logical development,” says Professor Henk Jochemsen, a medical
ethicist and Christian critic of euthanasia. “It’s another step in the wrong direction.”).
4. Euthanasia typically refers to an act of a physician that is primarily intended to
cause, and in fact causes, the death of a patient. Euthanasia was archaically referred to as
‘mercy killing,’ however, that term is generally avoided due to its highly pejorative connotation. See, e.g., Lara L. Manzione, Is There A Right to Die?: A Comparative Study of
Three Societies (Australia, Netherlands, United States), 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 443,
444–46 (2002).
5. The Dutch define euthanasia as “the termination of life by a doctor at the patient’s
request, with the aim of putting an end to unbearable suffering with no prospect of improvement.” MINISTRY OF HEALTH, WELFARE AND SPORTS, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT, EUTHANASIA: THE NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES (2002),
available at http://www.minvws.nl/en/folders/ibe/euthanasia_the_netherlands_new_rules.
asp [hereinafter NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES]. The generic term “euthanasia” derives from
ancient Greek for “good death,” meaning a wholesome and honorable end of one’s exis-
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Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act6 encapsulates within a single regulatory system developments
in Dutch medical practice and case law dating from 1984.7 Although the
Dutch criminal code continues to prohibit the intentional killing of another individual,8 a physician who performs euthanasia may invoke the
defense of noodtoestand9 and escape criminal prosecution, provided the
physician complies with specific statutory requirements.10
tence. THE NEW LEXICON WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 327
(1989). In general, the Greeks’ conception of euthanasia did not entail the benevolent
killing of another. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 78 (1994) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE]. Conceptually, commentators frequently distinguish among different kinds of euthanasia, for example, between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. A summary of the terminology used to describe various forms of euthanasia follows in Part II of this Note.
6. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act,
chs. 4-A, 4-B (2002) (Neth.) [hereinafter Termination of Life Act or “the Act”], available
at http://www.nvve.nl/assets/nvve/english/euthlawenglish.pdf. See Press Release, Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports, Bill for Testing Requests for Euthanasia and Help
With Suicide Passed by the Upper House (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www.
minvws.nl/en/press/ibe/bill_for_testing_requests_for_euthanasia.asp.
The Upper House of the Dutch Parliament passed the Termination of Life Act on
April 10, 2001 with forty-six votes for the Act and twenty-eight votes against. The Lower
House had approved the Act on November 28, 2000. Id. In September 2002, the Belgium
parliament passed a bill that legalized active euthanasia by a vote of eighty-six to fiftyone, with ten abstentions. Belgium Legalizes Euthanasia, BBC NEWS, May 16, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1991995.stm. Oregon has legalized euthanasia,
and two reported Japanese court decisions have stipulated the conditions under which
active euthanasia could be permitted in Japan. Danuta Mendelson & Timothy Stoltzfus
Jost, A Comparative Study of the Law of Palliative Care and End-of-Life Treatment, 31
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 130, 130 n.128 (2003).
7. NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 5 (“The new Act on euthanasia does
not change the legal status of termination of life on request or physician assisted suicide.”).
8. Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code states, “any person who terminates another
person’s life at that person’s express and earnest request shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding twelve years or a fifth-category fine.” Termination of Life
Act, ch. 4-A (2002) (Neth.). Article 294 states, “any person who intentionally incites
another to commit suicide shall, if suicide follows, be liable to a term of imprisonment
not exceeding three years or a fourth-category fine.” Id. ch. 4-B.
9. The Dutch term, “noodtoestand,” refers to “circumstances in which, faced with a
conflict between two interests, a person sacrifices the lesser interest to serve the greater
interest.” Julia Belian, Comment, Deference to Doctors in Dutch Euthanasia Law, 10
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 255, 260 n.36 (1996), citing L.H.C. Hulsman et al., The Dutch
Criminal Justice System From a Comparative Legal Perspective, in INTRODUCTION TO
DUTCH LAW FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS, 289, 303 (D.C. Fokkema et al. eds., 1978). In the
Netherlands, Article 40 of the Dutch Penal Code provides a general waiver of criminal
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The Dutch government asserts that its approach to euthanasia brings
the debate about euthanasia out into the open, protects “physicians and
other people” who are “concerned with the limits of human suffering,”
and promotes physician compliance with the law.11 Some Dutch physicians and international observers, on the other hand, express concern and
outright outrage.12 Not only has the Netherlands rejected centuries of
conventional Western morality, which counsels that the intentional killing of another individual is always morally wrong,13 the new law potentially opens the door to non-consensual mercy killings and statesanctioned murder.14
The Dutch attempt to regulate euthanasia is significant for three reasons. First, the decriminalization of euthanasia, initially by the courts and
subsequently by Parliamentary sanction in 2002, offers researchers access to the most complete and detailed data ever assembled regarding the
practice of euthanasia in a modern industrialized society.15 Second, the
liability for any individual who has committed a crime but was compelled to do so out of
moral or psychological necessity. Jos V.M. Welie, Why Physicians? Reflections on the
Netherlands’ New Euthanasia Law, 32 HASTING CTR. RPT. 42, 44 (2002).
10. The statutory requirements of due care are discussed in Part II of this Note.
11. NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 1 (“Thanks to the new Act, doctors
and terminally ill patients know now exactly what their rights and obligations are.”).
Paradoxically, even some opponents of the Termination of Life Act admit that the new
law finally provides clarity to a previously confusing mix of euthanasia statutes and
cases. See, e.g., Welie, supra note 9, at 44.
12. See, e.g., Karel F. Gunning, Why Not Euthanasia, COMPASSIONATE HEALTHCARE
NETWORK, Oct. 9, 2004, available at http://www.chninternational.com/why_not_eutha
nasia_by_karel_f.htm; Richard H. Nicholson, Death is the Remedy? Old World News,
European Laws on Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 23 HASTING CTR. RPT. 9,
9 (2002).
13. WESLEY J. SMITH, CULTURE OF DEATH: THE ASSAULT ON MEDICAL ETHICS IN
AMERICA 10–19 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Welie, supra note 9, at 44.
15. Paul van der Maas et al., Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other
Medical Practices Involving the End-of-Life in the Netherlands, 1990–1995, 335 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1699 (1996) [hereinafter Van der Maas Report]. In response to the protests
of pro-euthanasia citizen groups, political pressure from the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG), and several controversial euthanasia court decisions, the government
instituted a series of studies in order to quantify the frequency of euthanasia in the Netherlands and assess physician attitudes towards euthanasia. The first nationwide study,
known as the Remmelink Report, was commissioned in 1990 and chaired by the former
attorney general of the Supreme Court, Professor Jan Remmelink. Additional studies
were produced in 1995 and 2001. Although the original studies are not available in English, summaries of the 1995 and 2001 reports have been published by the original authors
in The New England Journal of Medicine and the British medical publication The Lancet,
respectively. See generally Van der Maas Report, supra. See also Bregie D. OnwuteakaPhilipsen et al., Euthanasia and other End-of-Life Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990,
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arguments raised in the Netherlands parallel the arguments currently being raised in other European nations and the United States.16 Finally, the
Termination of Life Act’s post-euthanasia reporting procedure and general reliance on voluntary physician compliance provides a concise case
study from which legislators and jurists may extract useful lessons of law
and public policy.17
According to the Dutch government’s own research, physicians intentionally kill patients without those patients’ request or consent in approximately one thousand cases each year.18 Other researchers, pointing
to the narrow definition of euthanasia used in the Netherlands and the
government’s own admission that physicians significantly under-report
the incidence of euthanasia, estimate that physicians intentionally end the
life of their patients in as many as six thousand cases annually without
consultation or consent.19 The staggeringly high incidence of nonconsensual euthanasia, as reported by the Dutch government’s own experts, suggests a systemic flaw in the government’s approach to euthanasia law.20
This Note will argue that the Dutch attempt to regulate euthanasia fails,
both conceptually and practically, to prevent non-consensual killing of
patients. Dutch physicians and jurists appear reluctant to face the empirical evidence of widespread non-consensual or “involuntary” euthanasia.21 By relying on the principle of noodtoestand or necessity, the Dutch
1995, and 2001, LANCET, June 17, 2003, available at http://image.thelancet.com/
extras/03art3297web.pdf [hereinafter Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report].
16. CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS 16 (1991).
17. For example, officials in the United Kingdom and the United States have referenced the Dutch approach during their domestic deliberations regarding PAS and euthanasia. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003); R. v. Dir. of
Public Prosecutions [2002] 63 B.M.L.R. 1 (U.K.); Manzione, supra note 4, at 452.
18. The one thousand cases of involuntary euthanasia each year represents between
0.7–0.8 percent of all deaths in the Netherlands. See Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra
note 15, at 2.
19. E.g., Herbert Hendin, The Dutch Experience, 17 ISSUES L. & MED. 223, 230–32
(2002).
20. Because no other state has formally legalized active euthanasia, there is little data
available with which to measure the Netherlands’ rates of voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia. One survey of physician attitudes regarding PAS and euthanasia suggests that
18.3 percent of American physicians have received a request for assistance with suicide
and 6 percent of American physicians have complied with such requests at least once.
Diane Meier et al., A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in
the United States, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1193 (1998).
21. For example, the authors of the 2001 report flatly state, in reference to the evidence of one thousand cases of termination of life without explicit request each year, that
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shift the focus of the legal inquiry to the physician instead of the patient
and thereby damage the foundational principle of patient autonomy. By
disavowing the principle of patient-autonomy in favor of the principle of
physician beneficence, the current approach to euthanasia regulation creates a system in which there appears to be no logical reason to prohibit
the non-consensual killing of sick or marginalized patients.22
Part II of this Note will present a brief overview of the Netherlands’
healthcare and legal systems and discuss early euthanasia case law. Part
III will critique the Termination of Life Act and the efficacy of the Act’s
due care requirements. Part IV will review empirical data from the Netherlands and other scholars’ research regarding the prevalence of euthanasia and other end-of-life medical decisions. Part V will critique the Netherlands’ euthanasia regulatory scheme and explain how its conceptual
approach permits and even encourages involuntary euthanasia.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE NETHERLANDS’ LEGAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH
SYSTEMS
A. Explanation of Terms and Phrases used in this Note
Despite voluminous academic writings and legal discourse on the subject, there is no universally accepted definition of “euthanasia.”23 In
common usage, the term typically refers to an act of a physician that is
primarily intended to cause, and in fact causes, the death of a patient.24
Significantly, the generic definition of euthanasia does not imply anything regarding the physician’s motives, the patient’s physical or emotional condition,25 or the imminence of death.26 Unless preceded by a
descriptive modifier such as “voluntary” or “active,” the appearance of
the word “euthanasia” in this Note refers to the generic definition.
“[a]pparently it is difficult to avoid this kind of action.” Richard Fenigsen, Dutch Euthanasia: The New Government Ordered Study, 20 ISSUES L. & MED. 73, 75 n.18 (2004),
citing Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, at 4.
22. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 135.
23. JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST
LEGALIZATION 9 (2002) [hereinafter KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY].
24. E.g., NEW YORK STATE supra, note 5, at 63.
25. Physicians refer to the process of evaluation and subsequent classification of a
patient’s condition, symptoms, or disease as the patient’s “diagnosis.” The accurate assessment and classification of a patient’s diagnosis allows physicians to “provide a logical basis for treatment.” TABERS’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 492–93 (C.K.
Thomas ed., 16th ed. 1989).
26. The prediction of the progression of a patient’s disease or condition, including the
estimated chance of recovery or eventual likelihood of death, is referred to as the patient’s “prognosis.” Id. at 1492.
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One conceptual dichotomy that has arisen is the distinction between
“active” and “passive” euthanasia. “Active” euthanasia refers to situations in which a physician performs an affirmative act, such as injecting
a lethal dosage of opiates into the patient, with the intent of causing the
patient’s death.27 In contrast, “passive” euthanasia refers to the physician’s inaction or omissions, such as withholding life-sustaining hydration and nutrients or refusing to initiate potentially life-sustaining therapies.28

27. JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 99–100 (John Keown ed., 1995) [hereinafter KEOWN, PERSPECTIVES].
28. Many Western societies have implicitly accepted the legality of, or more accurately, have refused to recognize the illegality of, passive euthanasia, although legislators
and physicians scrupulously avoid using the technical term. Only the Netherlands, Belgium, and the state of Oregon have legalized active euthanasia, although recent court
rulings in Japan hint that active euthanasia could be permitted in certain circumstances.
Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130 n.121.
On the other hand, passive euthanasia in the form of physicians withdrawing lifesustaining treatment from competent, adult patients is permitted in the United Kingdom,
Australia, Canada, Poland, Germany, France, Japan, and the United States. The Supreme
Court of the United States and the United Kingdom’s House of Lords have expressly
authorized physicians to withdraw life sustaining care for the purpose of hastening death.
Id. at 133.
In Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Missouri law that required “clear and convincing proof” of an incompetent patient’s wishes regarding euthanasia before a court could authorize the removal of life-sustaining nutrition and hydration therapy. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990). While upholding Missouri’s “clear and convincing”
standard of proof requirement, the Supreme Court appeared to uphold the earlier holding
of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan that a court may authorize, in appropriate cases, the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical care. Id.; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In Washington
v. Glucksberg, the Court later affirmed that patients have a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723
(1997). Currently, virtually every U.S. state and the District of Columbia recognize the
right of patients to request withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. S. Elizabeth Wilborn
Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating The Right To Refuse Medical
Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1052–53 (1998).
Similarly, in the British Tony Bland case, the parents of an accident victim who
had lapsed into a persistent vegetative coma sought to have his medical and nutritional
care stopped in order to facilitate his death. When a public magistrate sought to prevent
the hospital from withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment, a majority of the five
Law Lords who heard the case refused to enjoin the hospital from following the parents’
wishes. Although the House of Lords preferred not to characterize the proposed withdrawal of life-support as euthanasia, which they understood to be illegal in English common law, their decision implicitly recognized a moral and legal distinction between active and passive euthanasia. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 12–15.
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“Voluntary” euthanasia refers to euthanasia performed upon the explicit and affirmative request of a patient.29 In contrast, “involuntary
euthanasia” signifies an act of euthanasia performed without the request
or consent of the patient.30 The term involuntary euthanasia itself is subject to confusion. For some, involuntary euthanasia implies situations
where the patient did not provide consent but possessed the capacity to
do so.31 As such, involuntary euthanasia is different from “nonvoluntary” euthanasia, which involves patients who lack the legal or
physical capacity to provide consent.32 Under this approach, nonvoluntary euthanasia is the correct term to describe euthanasia performed
on adult patients who are mentally incapacitated or infants who therefore
lack the legal capacity to either provide or withhold consent. Other
commentators reject this approach and characterize any euthanasia performed without an explicit and affirmative request as involuntary euthanasia.33 Because of the host of conceptual problems raised by the distinction between involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, this Note will
avoid the term non-voluntary euthanasia.34

When the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, in a reply to the
Tony Bland decision, issued their Report one year later, the Law Lord’s reluctance to
refer to the withdrawal of care as “passive euthanasia” was only partly remedied. The
Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics chaired by Lord
Walton of Detchant, characterized the term “passive euthanasia” as “misleading” and
adopted the phrase “treatment-limiting decision.” KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note
23, at 96–100.
29. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 96–100.
30. Id. at 9–12.
31. See, e.g., Jocelyn Downie, The Contested Lessons of Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 8 HEALTH L.J. 119, 133 (2000) (responding to a report that as many as 14,691
patients were terminated without request in 1990, the author noted, “what [a critic] calls
involuntary euthanasia is at worst non-voluntary euthanasia and cessation of treatment.”).
32. Id.
33. E.g., JOHN LADD, ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO LIFE AND DEATH 8–9 (John Ladd
ed., 1979).
34. For example, consider the case of an adult, healthy individual who records a written request to receive euthanasia should the individual ever enter into a “lengthy” coma.
One year later, the individual suffers an accident and lapses into a coma. Complying with
the patient’s earlier written request, the physician provides euthanasia to the comatose
patient. Has the physician provided involuntary or non-voluntary euthanasia? Would the
answer change if the patient had only been in the coma for two hours? What if the patient had lain comatose for two years? While the precise characterization of this and
comparable examples are certainly open to debate, that debate provides only limited insight into the broader discussion of legalized euthanasia. Consequently, this Note will
classify all cases where the patient has not made an explicit, affirmative request for
euthanasia as involuntary euthanasia.
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Physicians, legislators and social commentators frequently distinguish
between euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS).35 In the case of
active voluntary euthanasia, a physician performs the actual step of administering the lethal treatment.36 Individuals who request PAS perform
the actual, volitional act of suicide but require the assistance of a physician to prescribe a suitable pharmaceutical agent to bring about death and
to be present during the actual suicide to ensure the correct and effective
utilization of that agent.37 Although many of the same moral and legal
issues arise under both PAS and euthanasia,38 this Note will not directly
address PAS. Moreover, because the Termination of Life Act treats PAS
and voluntary euthanasia similarly, the legal distinctions between active
voluntary euthanasia, on the one hand, and passive euthanasia or PAS on
the other, have been rendered moot.39
“Palliative care” is the technical term for the medical care given to relieve the pain and symptoms caused by severe illness, but not intended to
cure the underlying disease or condition itself.40 “Terminal sedation” refers to the administration of high doses of pain relieving medications for
the primary purpose of alleviating a patient’s suffering, but with reasonable awareness that death may result.41
Dutch physicians, as well as the Ministry of Health, Sports, and Welfare, which is responsible for monitoring compliance with the Termination of Life Act, do not distinguish among passive and active euthanasia.
35. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 12–15.
36. Id.
37. Even with a physician present, patients who attempt PAS frequently experience
medical complications. An analysis of the 1990 Van der Maas Report and 1995 Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report indicates that, in 16 percent of PAS cases, patients faced complications with completion, including longer-than-expected time to death, failure to induce coma, and induction of coma followed by awakening of the patient. See, e.g.,
Johanna Groenewoud et al., Clinical Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and
Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 551 (2000).
38. For example, opponents of euthanasia sometimes assert that efforts to decriminalize PAS represent political palatable tactics to pave the way for decriminalized voluntary
euthanasia. Wesley J. Smith, Continent Death: Euthanasia in Europe, LIFENEWS.COM,
http://www.lifenews.com/oped24.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). Jeff McMahan, a bioethicist, asserts, “[s]uicide and euthanasia are concepts with blurred edges. It is often
unclear whether a certain act counts as suicide or whether an act is an instance of euthanasia.” JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE
455–56 (2002).
39. See Termination of Life Act, chs. 4-A, 4-B. See also EUTHANASIA: THE
NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 5.
40. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 35.
41. In Japan, courts refer to terminal sedation as “indirect” euthanasia, a classification
not adopted in this Note. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130 n.23.
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The Termination of Life Act defines euthanasia as the “termination of a
life on request” and regulates both euthanasia and PAS.42 Thus, the
Dutch have eliminated the legal distinction between “active” and “passive” euthanasia.43 The official stance of the Dutch government is that all
cases of euthanasia are, by definition, active and voluntary.44 The Dutch
government prosaically refers to cases that foreign observers would
characterize as involuntary euthanasia as “ending of life without explicit
request.”45
B. The Dutch Historical Experience
The Netherlands’ enthusiastic acceptance of euthanasia invariably
prompts the question, of all of the liberal democracies of Western Europe
and industrialized nations of the modern world, why has the Netherlands
taken the bold step of decriminalizing voluntary euthanasia?46 Many
commentators explain Netherlands’ acceptance of voluntary euthanasia
as a natural outgrowth of the country’s historical tradition of progressive
politics and religious tolerance.47
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a population of over
16.3 million inhabitants.48 The Dutch won their independence from the
42. Termination of Life Act, pmbl.
43. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 16.
44. See Termination of Life Act, pmbl.; see also EUTHANASIA: THE NETHERLANDS’
NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 2 (“The voluntary nature of the patient’s request is crucial:
euthanasia may only take place at the explicit request of the patient.”).
45. E.g., Van der Maas Report, supra note 15.
46. As previously noted, in September 2002 Belgium became the second country to
legalize voluntary active euthanasia. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130.
47. Netherlands’ religious composition may be relevant for a variety of reasons. The
historical presence of distinct religious minorities, with sometimes markedly different
social customs and religious attitudes, appears to have instilled in the Dutch a highly
deferential attitude towards personal belief systems. HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY
DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND THE DUTCH CURE 135–36 (1997), citing T.H.C.
BUELLER, The Historical and Religious Framework for Euthanasia in the Netherlands,
THE GOOD OF THE PATIENT, THE GOOD OF SOCIETY (R.I. Misbin ed., 1992). Professor A.
van Dantzig, a retired expert in psychiatry, has asserted that, “[t]he whole of Dutch society is based on the cohabitation of people who fundamentally disagree on everything. The
sometimes very creative solutions . . . have given rise to the word ‘poldermodel,’ which
expressly means living compromise, or as I have once put it, the fair division of discontent.” Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Culture of Death” in the Netherlands: Dutch Perspectives, 17 ISSUES L. & MED. 167, 175 n.17 (2001). On the other hand, Dutch religious tolerance should not be overstated. One vocal critique of euthanasia, Dr. G.F. Koerselman,
reports that he has often been dismissed as a “Catholic fundamentalist,” even though he
was born Protestant and raised as a devout secularist. Id. at 172.
48. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: THE NETHERLANDS, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publi
cations/factbook (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
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Hapsburg Kings of Spain in the seventeenth century and, in the subsequent years, proceeded to develop a robust system of mercantilism and
broad civic equality.49 The Netherlands was an early center of Calvinist
activism and, in later centuries, was renowned for its religious tolerance
of both Jews and Roman Catholics.50 Occupied by the Germans during
World War II51 and a central member of the North Atlantic Treaty Or49. R.R. COLTON & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD, 126–31 (6th
ed. 1984).
50. HENDIN, supra note 47, at 135–36.
51. Until relatively recently, the collective memory of the Nazi occupation shaped
many civilian attitudes towards euthanasia. In October 1939, German Chancellor Adolph
Hitler signed an executive order instituting the T4 Euthanasia Program, named after the
program’s administrative offices at Tiergarten Strasse 4. Unlike the modern conception of
voluntary euthanasia, which envisions the termination of a sick and suffering patient
upon the patient’s affirmative request, the Nazi euthanasia program represents an extreme
manifestation of involuntary euthanasia as official government policy.
Administered by the Reich Chancellery under the direction of Philip Bouhler and
Dr. Karl Brandt, the program targeted German nationals suffering from mental incapacity, insanity, or severe congenital birth defects. Various estimates put the number of patients killed between 50,000 and 250,000 German civilians, representing both adults and
children. Physicians performed the medical screenings and selections. Patients selected
for euthanasia were transferred to one of several state-run hospitals located inside the
borders of pre-war Germany. Patients were killed either by lethal injection or by suffocation by carbon monoxide gas, delivered in specially constructed gas chambers designed
to look like communal showers. Typically, the victims’ relatives were later informed that
the patients had died of communicable diseases.
Although no foreign prisoners and only one thousand German Jews were killed by
the Nazi euthanasia program, T4 was a crucial testing period in which Nazi physicians
and bureaucrats developed the techniques later used in the extermination camps in Poland
and Eastern Europe. For example, the T4 program perfected the use of gassings to kill
large numbers of prisoners, while Franz Stabgl, commandant of the Sorbibor and Treblinka extermination camps, and Christian Wirth, commander of the Chemlno extermination camp, both received their operational training as T4 euthanasia technicians. The T4
program was discontinued in August 1941, shortly before Germany’s invasion of Russia,
largely due to massive public protests lead by Germany’s Catholic and Protestant religious communities. In 1942, S.S. Reichsfurher Heimlich Himmler reassigned the entire
former staff of the T4 program to Operation Reinhard, the Nazi campaign to exterminate
Polish Jewry.
Germany invaded the Netherlands on May 10, 1940 and continued to occupy the
Netherlands until 1945, by which point over 107,000 Dutch Jews had been deported.
Approximately 102,000 died in the Auschwitz, Sorbibor, and Bergen-Belsen death
camps. Many thousands of other Dutch civilians were also deported to concentration
camps in Nazi-occupied Europe, however, aside from the Jewish population, Dutch deportees were not generally targeted for extermination. Although no Dutch nationals died
in the T4 program, the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands continues to shape opinions
regarding euthanasia, and in the minds of many elderly Dutch citizens, euthanasia remains synonymous with state-sanctioned murder. See generally SMITH, supra note 13, at
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ganization,52 Netherlands was later a founding member of the European
Union.53 More recently, the country has adopted progressive policies in
its regulation of recreational drug use and prostitution, and remains at the
forefront in developments of international human rights law.54
Like many other nations of the European Union, the Dutch are committed to the principle of universal access to health care and health insurance.55 Health care is financed via a mixture of mandatory employmentrelated health insurance and population-wide coverage of long-term
care.56 Private health care providers deliver the bulk of health care services.57 Unsurprisingly, advocates for legalized euthanasia point to the
availability of universal health and long-term care as evidence that the
financial pressure of continuing treatment has not improperly influenced
patients who request euthanasia.58 On the other hand, some physicians
have noted that the Netherlands currently faces a shortage of nursing
homes and nursing staff.59
The Dutch enjoy one of the highest life expectancies and lowest death
rates of the industrialized world.60 Between 120,000 and 140,000 people
40–43; DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS 119 (1997);
MILTON MELTZER, NEVER TO FORGET: THE JEWS OF THE HOLOCAUST 131 (1976);
RICHARD RHODES, MASTERS OF DEATH: THE SS-EINSATZGRUPPEN AND THE INVENTION OF
THE HOLOCAUST 155–61 (2002); The T4 Euthanasia Program, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/t4.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2006).
52. North Atlantic Treaty, ratified Aug. 24, 1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
53. The Member States of the European Union: The Netherlands, http://europa.eu.int/
abc/european_countries/eu_members/netherlands/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2006).
54. See Belian, supra note 9, at 256 (“As harbingers of liberal social change, the
Dutch hold an almost prophetic role as they work through the tangles of contemporary
moral and legal debates.”) .
55. NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL
PUBLICATION SERIES, HEALTH CARE, HEALTH POLICIES AND HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN
THE NETHERLANDS 5 (2001), available at http://www.minvws.nl/images/Healthcare
07_tcm11-45335.pdf.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 6.
58. E.g., Leonard M. Fleck, Just Caring: Assisted Suicide and Health Care Rationing,
72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 879 (“[T]he Dutch have in place a scheme of national
health insurance. Therefore, there are no unsavory financial incentives motivating terminally ill Dutch individuals to opt for ‘voluntary’ euthanasia.”).
59. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Non-voluntary and Involuntary Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Dutch Perspectives, 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 239, 253 (2003).
60. The current average life expectancy is 76.68 years at birth, while the Dutch suffer
0.67 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants. In comparison, Americans suffer 8.34 deaths per 1,000
inhabitants and enjoy an average life expectancy of 77.43 years, while the United King-
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died each year from 2000 to 2003, while 55,000 of those typically expired from non-acute disease.61 According to official estimates, approximately 44 percent of all deaths involved end-of-life medical decisions62
while less than 3 percent of all deaths involve active voluntary euthanasia.63
C. Overview of the Dutch Legal System
The Netherlands’ legal system is a relatively typical European civil
code system.64 Unlike the American adversarial system, the Dutch legal
system is consensual, meaning that public prosecutors, judges, and litigators work together to arrive at decisions that meet the needs of the entire
community.65 Public prosecutors play a role in implementing public policy, and may waive prosecution of any criminal offense on the grounds
that the criminal offense could be more effectively dealt with using nonprosecutorial measures, for example, resorting to community involvement.66 Prosecutors are expressly required to refrain from prosecution if
such prosecution does not serve the public interest, a subjective standard
that the prosecutor alone has authority to determine.67 Although active
voluntary euthanasia remained technically illegal until the enactment of
the Termination of Life Act in 2001, for almost two decades prosecutors
declined to charge doctors who performed active euthanasia within the
limits suggested by the Dutch Supreme Court in 1984.68
As a member state of the European Union, the Netherlands’ national
laws are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundom suffers 10.19 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants and has an average life expectancy of
78.27 years. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: THE NETHERLANDS, http://www.odci.gov/cia/
publications/factbook (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
61. The leading causes of death include cancer, chronic heart failure, and cerebrovascular disease. Sixty-five percent of Dutch cancer related deaths occur at home, while 25
percent occur in a hospital and less than 1 percent in a hospice. NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE
FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION SERIES HEALTH,
WELFARE AND SPORT NO. 16, PALLIATIVE CARE FOR TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS IN THE
NETHERLANDS 4–5 (2003), available at http://www.minvws.nl/images/palliative_eng
_tcm11-45291.pdf.
62. Id. at 29. End-of-life medical decisions include express requests for PAS and
euthanasia as well as decisions to forego available medical treatment, such as additional
invasive therapies or life-sustaining nutrition and hydration.
63. Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, tbl. 1.
64. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130.
65. Hendin, supra note 19, at 236.
66. JULIA FIONDA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
98–99 (1995).
67. Belian, supra note 9, at 258–59.
68. See generally Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130.
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damental Freedoms.69 As such, Dutch courts are bound by the decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights.70 Significantly, in the same
month that the Termination of Life Act went into effect, the European
Court of Human Rights held in Pretty v. United Kingdom that the Convention does not confer upon citizens an affirmative right to euthanasia,
although apparently the Convention does not preclude the Dutch government from permitting voluntary euthanasia.71
Before the Termination of Life Act went into effect on April 1, 2002,
Article 293 of the Dutch criminal code, the het Wetboek van Strafecht,
prohibited any individual from killing another at the latter’s request. An
69. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1953) [hereinafter Convention on Human Rights]; see also Mendelson & Jost, supra note
6, at 130.
70. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130.
71. Diane Pretty, a British subject, suffered from motor neurone disease, a degenerative illness. As the disease progressed and she became paralyzed, Mrs. Pretty decided that
she wanted to commit suicide but lacked the physical capacity to do so. Id. at 68. She
petitioned the British Director of Public Prosecutions for an exception that would allow
her husband to escape criminal sanction if he assisted her in committing suicide. Id. at
68–69. After the prosecutor refused her petition and the House of Lords denied her appeal, Mrs. Pretty sued the British government in the European Court of Human Rights,
alleging that the British government’s position amounted to violations of Articles 2, 3, 8,
9 and 14 of the Convention. Id. at 67.
Mrs. Pretty alleged that, because the United Kingdom had abolished the felony of
suicide in 1961, the British law prohibiting a person from assisting in another’s suicide
constituted discrimination against individuals who, like Mrs. Pretty, were paralyzed and
could not take their own lives. Id. at 88. Moreover, Article 2 of the Convention, which
protects the “right to life” and narrowly regulates the permissible deprivation of life by
state actors, also guaranteed a converse right to die. Id. at 75. Finally, Mrs. Pretty alleged
that, by failing to provide assistance in her attempt to commit suicide, the United Kingdom was subjecting her to “inhuman or degrading treatment” in violation of the Article 3
prohibition against the use of torture. Id. at 77.
In a widely read and much anticipated decision, the European Court of Human
Rights in a unanimous decision held against Mrs. Pretty on every count. The court rejected the contention that Article 2 contained a “negative aspect.” Id. at 77. In other
words, the Convention protects individuals’ rights to life from violation by the government or individuals, but does not create a right to choose the manner of one’s own death.
Id. at 81. The court affirmed that Article 3 pertained to the intentional use of state power
and imposed a obligation on states not to inflict serious harm on persons within their
jurisdiction. Article 3 does not establish the countervailing responsibility to prevent all
harm to such persons. Id. Finally, the court declined to recognize Mrs. Pretty’s class of
persons, namely those who are physically unable to commit suicide, as a class warranting
protection under the Convention. Id. at 86. In short, the European Court on Human Rights
held that the Convention did not confer a “right to die” and therefore upheld the authority
of signatory states to proscribe active euthanasia. See In the case of Pretty v. United
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 423 (2002), reprinted in 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 67, 71 (2002).
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individual found guilty of such an offense may have been sentenced to
up to twelve years of imprisonment.72 Article 294 of the code prohibited
an individual from assisting or inciting another person to commit suicide,73 with a possible sentence of three years of imprisonment.74
The Dutch criminal justice system recognizes the noodtoestand defense, variously translated as force majeure,75 choice-of-evils,76 or the
defense of necessity.77 The noodtoestand defense states that an individual, when faced with two conflicting duties, may violate one law in order
to avoid violating another law or principle of greater moral significance.78 Alternatively, the choice may be characterized as one in which
the individual chooses the “least unacceptable” option available.79 Thus,
an innocent bystander, seeing a pedestrian about to be run over by a
speeding car, may be excused for the crime of battery when the bystander pushes the pedestrian out of the way in order to prevent the pedestrian’s death.80 Article 40 of the Dutch Penal Code codifies the noodtoestand principle.81 The Dutch concept of noodtoestand remains significant because Dutch courts have come to rely on it, as codified in Article

72. See SR art. 293 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES, THE DUTCH PENAL CODE 200 (Louise Rayar trans., 1997) [hereinafter AMERICAN
SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES].
73. See SR art. 294 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES, supra note 72, at 200. Indeed, the criminal prohibition of assistance with or incitement to suicide predated the adoption of the Dutch Penal Code in 1886. See also
Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130.
74. See SR art. 294 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES, supra note 72, at 200.
75. E.g., GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 37–38. “Force majeure” is French for “a superior
force” and in Anglo-American jurisprudence refers to “[a]n event or effect that can be
neither anticipated nor controlled.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 657 (7th ed. 1999).
76. See GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 37–38.
77. Some commentators have asserted that the passage of the Termination of Life Act
merely provided statutory basis for physicians’ previously recognized de facto immunity
from prosecution. E.g., Nicholson, supra note 12, at 9.
78. See KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 84–85.
79. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 37–38.
80. See generally Belian, supra note 9, at 261. Unlike English and American legal
systems, the Dutch do not appear to distinguish among legal excuses, defenses, and excuses. See generally AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, supra note 72, at 73–
74 (listing statutory provisions which may either decrease or increase liability for otherwise criminal conduct).
81. See SR art. 40 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES,
supra note 72, at 73.
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40, as the doctrinal justification for the legality of both active voluntary
and, as will be seen, active involuntary euthanasia.82
One last feature of the Dutch legal system concerns the Medical Assistance Act of 1994, which entered into force in 1995.83 The Medical Assistance Act codifies the principle of informed consent, the common law
doctrine that all legally competent adult patients must consent to treatment prior to undergoing medical care.84 As a corollary, the doctrine of
informed consent states that patients enjoy the right to refuse unwanted
medical care, including potentially life-saving care.85 Physicians have the
duty to explain, in lay terms, the nature of a patient’s condition, a description of any proposed treatment or therapy, the risks associated with
the proposed treatment, and the availability of any alternative treatments.86 Patient rights law in the Netherlands therefore mirrors the informed consent laws of most other developed nations.87
III. THE DUTCH APPROACH TO REGULATING EUTHANASIA
A. Euthanasia Case Law
Prior to 2002, active euthanasia remained technically illegal under Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code.88 Public prosecutors and the courts
therefore turned to the principle of noodtoestand to justify euthanasia and
excuse physicians from criminal penalties.89 The first case that expressly
decriminalized euthanasia occurred in the town of Alkmaar in 1984. In
the Alkmaar case, the Dutch Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a
82. See Welie, supra note 9, at 42–43; see generally Ubaldus de Vries, A Dutch Perspective: The Limits of Lawful Euthanasia, 13 ANN. HEALTH L. 365 (2004).
83. Nel Koster, Patient Rights and Patient Education in the Netherlands, UNIV.
NOTTINGHAM STUDENT HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CENTRE, May 19, 1997, available at
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/hrnews/may97/koster.htm.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. T. PATRICK HILL & DAVID SHIRLEY, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE RIGHT TO
DIE, A GOOD DEATH: TAKING MORE CONTROL AT THE END OF YOUR LIFE 7–8 (Sharon
Sharp ed., 1992).
87. All common law and most civil code systems presume the right of competent
adults to consent or refuse medical intervention, including life-sustaining treatment,
unless that presumption is rebutted. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130.
88. See SR art. 293 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES, supra note 72, at 200.
89. The irony of using noodtoestand defense in euthanasia cases has not been lost on
some foreign commentators. Article 293 was adopted to discourage suicide by imposing
criminal sanctions on individuals who assist in suicide. In essence, reliance on noodtoestand allows Dutch courts to use a legal exception in order to nullify a law that was
created to eliminate the exception. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 25.
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physician who had performed euthanasia on a ninety-five year old
woman whose health was deteriorating.90 The woman suffered from
moderate but not “acute” pain and was not facing imminent death.91 In
pronouncing the defendant guilty but imposing no punishment, the district court rejected the physician’s attempt to establish a noodtoestand
defense. The defendant argued that he had attempted in good faith to resolve his conflicting duties, namely, to observe the Article 293 prohibition against killing another individual and his duty to respond to the patient’s request to alleviate her unbearable suffering.92 The defendant,
with assistance from the Netherlands Society for Voluntary Euthanasia,93
appealed to the Dutch Supreme Court, which overturned his conviction
and ordered the district court to reconsider the noodtoestand defense.94
Interestingly, the Dutch Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s initial
theory of the case. The defendant had agued that the ethical conflict involved his duty to obey Article 293, on the one hand, and his professional responsibility to respect his patient’s right to personal autonomy,
on the other.95 Disposing of the personal autonomy argument, the court
noted that the district court had overlooked the physician’s duty to alleviate his patient’s suffering according to the prevailing standards of
medical ethics.96
The Supreme Court’s line of reasoning significantly influenced the
conceptual development of euthanasia law. First, the court expressly denied the significance, as a determinative factor in euthanasia cases, of the
patient’s right to personal autonomy, manifest here as her right to determine the course of her own medical treatment.97 Secondly, the Alkmaar
case established the precedent in which Dutch courts would turn to the
medical profession itself to develop the ethical standards through which
the courts would legitimize physician conduct.98 The court’s adoption of

90. This case is variously referred to as the “Schoonheim case,” after the name of the
physician defendant, or the “Alkmaar case,” after the name of the town where the events
occurred. E.g., Belian, supra note 9, at 267–68.
91. Id.
92. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130.
93. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 36.
94. Belian, supra note 9, at 268–71.
95. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 36.
96. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 85. The Dutch Supreme Court appears
to have relied on the beneficent approach to medical ethics, which holds that it is the
physician’s prerogative, as opposed to the patient’s right, to decide the proper course of
medical treatment.
97. See Downie, supra note 31, at 124.
98. Belian, supra note 9, at 270.
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these two principles would later result in increased legal acceptance of
involuntary euthanasia.
Soon after the Alkmaar case was decided, the Royal Dutch Medical
Association (KNMG) published a set of “due care” guidelines that purported to define the circumstances in which Dutch physicians could ethically perform euthanasia.99 The KNMG guidelines stated that, in order
for a physician to respond to a euthanasia request with due care, the
euthanasia request must be voluntary, persistent, and well-considered.100
The patient must suffer from intolerable and incurable pain and a discernable, terminal illness.101 Thereafter, Dutch courts adopted the
KNMG guidelines as the legal prerequisites of due care in a series of
cases between 1985 and 2001.102
Despite the integration of the KNMG’s due care provisions, courts remained confused regarding what clinical circumstances satisfied the requirements of due care. In 1985, a court acquitted an anesthesiologist
who provided euthanasia to a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis.103
The court thereby eliminated the due care requirement that a patient must
suffer from a terminal illness. By 1986, courts decided that a patient need
not suffer from physical pain; mental anguish would also satisfy the “intolerable pain” due care requirement.104 Similarly, all reported prosecutions of euthanasia prior to 1993 involved patients who suffered from
either physical or mental pain.105 Then, in the 1993 Assen case, a district
court acquitted a physician who had performed active voluntary euthanasia on an otherwise healthy, forty-three year old woman.106 The patient
did not suffer from any diagnosable physical or mental condition, but had
recently lost both of her sons and had divorced her husband.107 With the
Assen case, Dutch courts seemed to abandon the requirement that a pa-

99. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 83.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. HENDIN, supra note 47, at 47–48.
103. Downie, supra note 31, at 125. Multiple sclerosis is an inflammatory disease of
the central nervous system. Although extremely painful and massively debilitating, multiple sclerosis is not typically terminal. See TABERS’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1156–57 (C.K. Thomas ed., 16th ed. 1989).
104. Herbert Hendin, The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 427,
428 (1996).
105. HENDIN, supra note 47, at 48.
106. The 1993 case against Dr. Chabot is frequently referred to as the “Assen case,”
after the city in which the trial was held. Id. at 47–48.
107. Id.
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tient suffer from intolerable pain or, for that matter, from any discernable
medical condition as a pre-condition for the noodtoestand defense.108
By 1999, Dutch euthanasia case law seemed to have weakened the
“voluntary and well-considered request” requirement as well. Public
prosecutors declined to bring charges against a physician who acquiesced
to a request for PAS from a seventy-one year old male patient with vascular dementia.109 Because the patient was suffering from a degenerative
psycho-organic disorder, the patient’s hospital organized a consultation
by the hospital’s chief psychiatrist, a committee of independent medical
professionals, and an external psychiatric consultant.110 After the review
committee and other consultants concluded that the patient possessed the
requisite mental competence to make a PAS request, the patient’s doctor
prescribed a high-dose barbiturate solution.111 However, the patient did
not actually drink the solution and commit suicide until four months after
his psychiatric evaluation.112 In those four months, there appears to have
been no effort to continue to monitor the patient’s mental capacity.
Through these series of decisions, Dutch courts diluted most of the due
care requirements first articulated by the KNMG guidelines.113 Indeed,
foreign critics saw incontrovertible evidence that the Netherlands had
descended the slippery slope towards completely unfettered euthanasiaon-demand.114 Other detractors went further, arguing that the Dutch at108. Since the Assen court acquitted Dr. Chabot in 1993, the court’s holding that a
patient need not suffer from a diagnosable medical condition is no longer valid under
Dutch case law. In 2003, after the Termination of Life Act went into effect, the Dutch
Supreme Court ruled in the Sutorius case that “being tired of life” was not a sufficient
reason for assenting to a patient’s request for active euthanasia. In that decision, the court
upheld the conviction of Dr. Sutorius, who had performed euthanasia on former Dutch
senator Edward Brongersma. An Amsterdam court had convicted Dr. Sutorius under
Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code but had imposed no penalty. Responding to his appeal, the Dutch Supreme Court held that a patient’s suffering must be linked to a recognized physical or mental condition. Tony Sheldon, Being Tired is Not Grounds for
Euthanasia, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (2003).
109. Tony Sheldon, Euthanasia Endorsed in Dutch Patient with Dementia, 319 BRIT.
MED. J. 75 (1999).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. For example, one witness, testifying before the Canadian Senate Committee on
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, asserted, “Netherlands is no longer on the slippery
slope; it has turned into Niagara Falls. . . .” Downie, supra note 31, at 119 n.2; GOMEZ,
supra note 16, at 38–39.
There are three different types of slippery slope arguments that critics of the
Dutch euthanasia system rely upon. First, some critics argue that legalization increases
the frequency and volume of cases of voluntary euthanasia. As Jocelyn Downie demon-
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tempt to regulate euthanasia failed to prevent involuntary euthanasia as
well.115
The Dutch appeared to have crossed the Rubicon when, in December
2004, the Groningen Academic Hospital announced new guidelines that
would permit physicians to perform involuntary euthanasia on severely
handicapped newborn infants.116 Equally troubling, the hospital revealed
that it had already performed four such killings in 2004117 and had been
performing similar procedures since at least 2000.118 The revelation coincided with reports that the KNMG had asked the Ministry of Health,
Sports, and Welfare to recommend new guidelines that would permit
involuntary euthanasia for “children, the severely mentally retarded and
patients in irreversible comas.”119 Predictably, this latest evidence of involuntary euthanasia has engendered a fresh wave of alarm among international observers.120
Netherlands’ euthanasia case law suggests three primary findings.
First, rather than addressing euthanasia as a question of patients’ rights or
self-determination, Dutch courts frame the euthanasia debate as a question of prevailing medical ethics.121 Second, by defining the extent of a
physician’s duty in terms of “prevailing standards of medical ethics,” and
by adopting the KNMG’s proposed practice guidelines as binding law,
Dutch courts institutionalized a broad degree of deference to the opinions
strates, the empirical data provided by three consecutive studies indicates that this argument is not valid; after an initial increase in the number of voluntary euthanasia cases
between 1990 and 1995, the number of voluntary euthanasia cases appears to have stabilized from 1995 through 2001. Downie, supra note 31, at 135.
The second slippery slope argument, dubbed the comparative international argument, asserts that the Netherlands’ euthanasia policy has resulted in a relative higher
incidence of euthanasia in Netherlands compared to other nations. Although Ms. Downie
asserts that data exists that suggests this argument is false with respect to Australia, there
is simply insufficient reliable data regarding the incidence of euthanasia in most other
countries to prove the veracity or falsehood of this argument. Id. at 136.
Finally, a third version of the slippery slope is the argument that, by decriminalizing voluntary active euthanasia, the Dutch approach has inoculated Dutch physicians, the
courts, and society against the unacceptability of involuntary euthanasia. E.g., KEOWN,
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 70.
115. HENDIN, supra note 47, at 23.
116. Horsnell, supra note 1, at 13.
117. Id.
118. Casey Research: What We Now Know, Euthanasia: The Netherlands’ Slippery
Slope, Dec. 14, 2004, http://www.howestreet.com/story.php?ArticleId=815 [hereinafter
Casey Research].
119. The Dutch Ponder “Mercy Killing” Rules, CNN.COM (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.
cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/12/01/netherlands.mercykill/index.html.
120. E.g., Casey Research, supra note 118.
121. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 36–37.
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and social judgments of the medical community.122 Finally, the KNMG
guidelines, originally intended to safeguard against physician abuse, have
consistently failed to prevent Dutch physicians from performing euthanasia in a widening array of clinical circumstances.123 These findings indicate that the courts have abrogated at least some of their responsibility to
serve as an independent check on physician conduct.
B. The 2002 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act
As previously noted, the Termination of Life Act codifies, with several
minor but important modifications, substantially all of the due care requirements adopted by Dutch courts since 1984.124 Technically, both active voluntary euthanasia and PAS remain criminal offenses under the
Dutch Penal Code.125 However, the Act grants a statutory exemption for
a physician who performs active voluntary euthanasia when the physician satisfies the requirement of due care and subsequently notifies the
municipal pathologist.126 Significantly, the Act does not address involuntary euthanasia or terminal sedation. Presumably, both practices remain
illegal, but as with active voluntary euthanasia prior to 1984, physicians
who perform involuntary euthanasia or terminal sedation rarely face serious criminal penalties.127
The first requirement of due care states that the physician who seeks to
perform euthanasia must “hold the conviction that the request by the patient was voluntary and well-considered.”128 The Act thus dispenses with
the requirement, first suggested in the 1984 KNMG guidelines, that the

122. See generally Belian, supra note 9.
123. As one vocal Dutch critic of the legalization of euthanasia has stated, “[i]f we
today accept the intentional killing of a patient as a solution for one problem, then tomorrow we will find a hundred problems for which killing must be accepted as a solution.”
Gunning, supra note 12.
124. See generally Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130.
125. Termination of Life Act, chs. 4-A, 4-B.
126. Id.
127. For example, Dr. Wilfred van Oijen, an active euthanasia advocate who appeared
in a 1994 television documentary on euthanasia, was convicted of murder in November
of 2004. Dr. van Oijen had injected a lethal dose of alcuronium chloride into an eightyfour year old comatose patient. The patient had made no previous euthanasia request and
was expected to die within 48 hours. The Dutch Supreme Court held that Dr. van Oijen’s
conduct failed to satisfy both the due care requirements of the Termination of Life Act
and the prevailing standards of palliative care, and therefore was guilty of murder. After
seven years of trials and appeals, Dr. van Oijen received a one week suspended sentence.
Tony Sheldon, Two Test Cases in Netherlands Clarify Law on Murder and Palliative
Care, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 1206 (2004).
128. Termination of Life Act, ch. 2, art. 2(1)(a).
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patient’s request was “durable” and “persistent.”129 More importantly, the
earlier KNMG guidelines indicated that the patient’s request must be free
and voluntary, while the new Termination of Life Act only requires that
the physician “hold the conviction” that the patient’s request is free and
voluntary.130 The Act, therefore, appears to adopt a less rigorous standard
than the KNMG guidelines.
Similarly, the second requirement of due care states that the physician
must “hold the conviction that the patient’s suffering was lasting and unbearable.”131 Like the “voluntary and well-considered” element, the emphasis on the “lasting and unbearable suffering” requirement is not on
the patient’s actual state of suffering, but rather the physician’s subjective belief. Moreover, the Termination of Life Act does not define “suffering” as either physical or emotional pain, nor does the Act provide
objective criteria or clinical indicators that would assist physicians or
prosecutors in determining whether a patient’s actual suffering fits the
statutory standard.
The clinical due care requirement states that the patient must “hold the
conviction that there was no other reasonable solution for the situation he
was in.”132 Unlike the “voluntary and well-considered” and “lasting and
unbearable suffering” requirements, the “no other solution” criteria
places the emphasis on the patient’s subjective beliefs. Ironically, the
availability of other medical solutions represents the one due care requirement that physicians, by virtue of their professional training and
clinical expertise, are better positioned than patients to decide. Once
again, the Termination of Life Act appears to have misallocated the responsibilities between the physician and the patient.
Regarding the Act’s procedural requirements, a physician must, as a
preliminary step, have informed the patient about the “situation he was in
and his prospects.”133 This procedural protection represents a reaffirmation of the doctrine of informed consent first codified in the Medical Assistance Act of 1994.134 Finally, the Act also requires that the physician
consult with a colleague prior to performing the requested euthanasia.135

129. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 85. The old standard of “durable and
persistent” incorporated the important dimension of time, whereas the new standard presumably dispenses with the requirement that a patient’s desire to undergo euthanasia be
maintained for any discernable length of time.
130. Termination of Life Act, ch. 2, art. 2(1)(a).
131. Id. ch. 2, art. 2(1)(b).
132. Id. ch. 2, art. 2(1)(d).
133. Id. ch. 2, art. 2(1)(c).
134. Koster, supra note 83.
135. Termination of Life Act, ch. 2, art. 2(1)(e).
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The Act stipulates that the physician consulted must actually see the patient and provide a written opinion as to whether the patient meets the
statutory requirements of due care.136 Once the requirements of due care
are met and the euthanasia is performed, the physician must notify the
municipal pathologist and document the patient’s death as termination
from non-natural causes.137 The pathologist, in turn, is required to perform an autopsy to determine how the euthanasia was performed and to
provide independent documentation of the event.138 Finally, all cases of
euthanasia must be reported to one of five regional euthanasia review
committees who are charged with ensuring physician compliance with
the due care requirements.139
The due care provisions are striking for what basic procedural protections appear to be missing. First, it remains unclear what specific information or technical details regarding euthanasia the physician must disclose to the patient.140 Likewise, the physician is not obligated to obtain
formal documentation of consent. There is no mandatory waiting period.
Patients are not required to undergo a psychiatric screening or other mental competency evaluation. The Act does not specify what types of physicians are permitted to perform euthanasia.141 Finally, the only procedural protections that involve non-physicians, namely, the post-mortem
evaluation by the pathologist and documentary review by the regional
review committees, occur after the patient has already died.142 In other
words, the Termination of Life Act relies solely on physician selfregulation and after-the-fact review to identify and prevent cases of involuntary euthanasia.

136. Id.
137. NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 7.
138. Id.
139. The review committees consist of, at a minimum, one lawyer, one bioethicist, and
one physician. Members are paid for their services, may be removed at any time without
cause, and serve as a clearinghouse for euthanasia data and liaison among the physician
community, national government, and local public prosecutors. Termination of Life Act,
ch. 3, arts. 3–19.
140. For example, Dutch physicians have noted that the euthanasia procedure itself
sometimes results in clinical complications, including failure to induce coma, induction
of coma followed by the patient’s re-awakening, and longer-then-expected time until
death. Johanna H. Groewoud et al., Clinical Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and PAS in the Netherlands, 34 N.E. J. MED. 551 (2000).
141. Apparently, radiologists, dermatologists, and foot surgeons may perform euthanasia with equal competence as internists or anesthesiologists. The only limitation appears
to be the general standard of due care which, as previously noted, represents a completely
self-defining standard for the medical profession.
142. Termination of Life Act, ch. 3, art. 3.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING EUTHANASIA
A. Source of Data and Methodology
The preceding sections traced the decriminalization of euthanasia by
Dutch courts, the adoption and subsequent deterioration of the due care
requirements recommended by the leading Dutch medical society,143 and
the expansion of the situations and circumstances in which euthanasia
might be considered accepted medical practice.144 Growing public support for euthanasia culminated in the passage of the Termination of Life
Act in 2002.145 When the Dutch Supreme Court first decriminalized
euthanasia in 1984, however, physicians, patient advocates, and the
Dutch government all lacked hard data concerning the frequency and
nature of actual euthanasia practice.
In response to the public debate and growing body of case law, the
Dutch government commissioned the first nationwide study of euthanasia and PAS in the Netherlands in 1990.146 The resultant Remmelink Report constituted a comprehensive study of end-of-life medical decision.147 The government commissioned similar studies in 1995 with the
Van der Maas Report and again in 2001 with the Onwuteaka-Philipsen
Report.148 These reports provide unparalleled information regarding the
frequency of euthanasia during the specific years studied and general
trends regarding euthanasia and end-of-life treatment decisions in a modern industrialized society.149
For each study, the researchers conducted a series of interviews with
approximately 400 general practitioners, specialists, and nursing home
143. Id. ch. 2, art. 2.
144. Id.
145. Id. chs. 3, arts. 4-A, 4-B. It is perhaps significant that, although the Netherlands’
euthanasia regime is the most far reaching and therefore classically liberal regulatory
regime of all developed nations, the legalization of voluntary active euthanasia was ultimately achieved through the electoral political process. In the United States, developments in the law relating to end-of-life medical decisions have typically occurred through
litigation. Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (passive
voluntary euthanasia); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Oregon v. Ashcroft,
192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002) (PAS).
146. The commission was chaired by the attorney general of the Dutch Supreme Court,
Professor Jan Remmelink. Van der Maas Report, supra note 15.
147. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 59, at 240–41.
148. See Van der Maas Report, supra note 15 at 1699; Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report,
supra note 15, at 1. In addition, the original 272-page Dutch version of the OnwuteakaPhilipsen Report has been translated and analyzed by Dr. Richard Fenigsen for his own
research. His findings were published in 2004. Fenigsen, supra note 20.
149. The 2001 report provides summary data comparing the results of the 1990, 1995,
and 2001 studies. See Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra, note 15, at 1–5.
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physicians.150 The researchers adopted strict procedural safeguards to
ensure the anonymity of both the physician interview subjects and the
deceased patients.151 In addition to the interview component of each
study, researchers analyzed large samples of death certificates provided
by the Dutch government, representing over 40,000 deaths in each of the
three studies and encompassing the entire universe of natural and nonnatural deaths.152
Foreign observers note that the government-ordered studies reflect the
distinct usages and phrases of the Dutch approach to euthanasia. For example, the studies eschew the term involuntary euthanasia in favor of the
phrase, “ending of life without a patient’s explicit request.”153 Likewise,
the authors avoid the term “terminal sedation” in favor of “alleviation of
symptoms with possible life-shortening effect.”154 “Euthanasia” in the
official reports refers to active voluntary euthanasia, while cases which
might otherwise be classified as passive voluntary euthanasia are generally described as “non-treatment decisions.”155 Consequently, foreign
observers may interpret the empirical data differently than the studies’
authors.
B. Voluntary Euthanasia and PAS
In 2001, almost two out of every five deaths in the Netherlands were at
least partly attributable to a medical decision to hasten the patient’s
death.156 Patients made 9,700 explicit requests for euthanasia.157 Dutch
150. Id. at 1–2.
151. Id.
152. See Van der Maas Report, supra note 15, at 1700. The 40,000 cases studied in
each report included a cross section of all Dutch deaths for the study period, including
deaths from natural and non-natural causes.
153. Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, tbl. 2.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1 (“[A]bout 39% of all deaths seemed to be preceded by a medical decision
that probably or certainly hastened death.”).
157. Of the documented requests for euthanasia, less than one-third resulted in a physician actually performing euthanasia. It remains unclear, however, how many of the remaining two-thirds of patients died from natural causes before the treating physician
could act on those requests. The fact that at least some patients die from natural causes
prior to receiving euthanasia appears to rebut the principle argument in favor of active
euthanasia, namely, that it is necessary to relieve patients’ suffering. See OnwuteakaPhilipsen Report, supra note 15, tbl. 1.
Defenders of Dutch euthanasia practices argue that the consistently low proportion of euthanasia cases to euthanasia requests belies the charge that Dutch physicians are
overeager to perform euthanasia, and reflects the seriousness and caution with which
physicians undertake end-of-life treatment decisions. However, the 1995 Van der Maas
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physicians actually performed euthanasia 3,500 times, representing 2.6
percent of all deaths.158 Compared to previous years, the number of requests for euthanasia increased slightly, from 8,900 requests in 1990 to
9,700 requests in 1995.159 Thereafter, the number of euthanasia requests
stabilized.160 Interestingly, PAS is generally unpopular in the Netherlands, accounting for only 0.2 percent of all deaths in 2001. Together, the
official figures for voluntary euthanasia and PAS account for less than 3
percent of all deaths.
The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports reports that between 4 percent and 10 percent of all deaths occurred following terminal sedation in
2002.161 These official figures probably understate the actual incidence of
terminal sedation, which the authors refer to as “alleviation of symptoms
with possible life-shortening effect,”162 as the reports indicate that an additional 20 percent of all deaths involved alleviation of symptoms with
the foreseeable potential side effect of shortening the patient’s life.163
Therefore, assuming that the relative percentage of deaths due to terminal sedation could not have changed dramatically between 2001 and
2002, the actual number of cases of terminal sedation may account for
between 24 percent and 30 percent of all deaths each year.
While the official government report concludes that only 2.6 percent of
all deaths involve active voluntary euthanasia, that figure probably understates the actual incidence of euthanasia in the Netherlands. The
Dutch government has indicated that physician self-reporting of euthanasia and other end-of-life treatment decisions has consistently declined

Report indicates that 59 percent of euthanasia cases resulted in the shortening of the patient’s life by less than one week, and over 90 percent by less than one month. Although
the Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report omitted similar data in the 2001, both the number of
euthanasia requests and the number of euthanasia cases remained relatively constant between 1995 and 2001. Id. tbl. 4. Most likely, the vast majority of euthanasia cases in 2001
resulted in shortened life spans of less than one month.
158. End-of-life decisions include active euthanasia, PAS, termination of life without
explicit request, possible cases of terminal sedation, and withholding or withdrawing lifesustaining treatment. Bregie D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., Euthanasia and other End-ofLife Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990, 1995, and 2001, tbl. 1, LANCET, June 17, 2003,
available at http://image.thelancet.com/extras/03art3297web.pdf.
159. Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, at tbl. 1.
160. Id. tbls. 1–2.
161. Tony Sheldon, ‘Terminal Sedation’ Different from Euthanasia, Dutch Ministers
Agree, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 465 (2003), available at http://bmj.com/cgi/content/full/
327/7413/465–a.
162. Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, tbl. 4.
163. Id. tbl. 1.
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between 1990 and 2001.164 Currently, the Ministry of Health, Welfare,
and Sports estimates that physician self-reporting reflects only half of the
actual cases of euthanasia.165 Consequently, the actual incidence of active
voluntary euthanasia could be double the official estimates.
C. Involuntary Euthanasia
All three studies explicitly addressed the practice of involuntary euthanasia, obliquely referred to in the official reports as “ending the life of
patients without explicit request.”166 Involuntary euthanasia occurred in
approximately 900 cases each year from 1995 through 2001.167 These
cases represented 0.7 percent of all deaths in 1995 and 0.6 percent in
2001.168 In general, the official estimates of involuntary euthanasia suggest that the practice is a relatively rare but stable component of Dutch
medical practice.
The 1995 Van der Maas Report reported that in about half the involuntary euthanasia cases the patient had previously expressed a wish for
euthanasia in the event that the patient’s suffering became unbearable.169
Likewise, in slightly less than half of all involuntary euthanasia cases,
the patient had not discussed euthanasia with the physician nor expressed
a wish to be relieved of suffering.170 Significantly, in 79 percent of these
cases, the patient was mentally incompetent.171 The same figures also
lead to the inescapable conclusion that, in approximately 210 cases each
year, Dutch physicians intentionally terminated the lives of mentally
competent patients without consultation or consent.
The Van der Maas Report further reported that, in about 95 percent of
cases of termination without explicit consent, the physician discussed the
decision to terminate the life of the patient with either a colleague or the
patient’s relatives.172 Relatives were consulted 70 percent of the time,
164. Tony Sheldon, Only Half of Dutch Doctors Report Euthanasia, Report Says, 326
BRIT. MED. J. 1164 (2003).
165. Id.
166. Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, tbl. 3.
167. Sheldon, supra note 164.
168. Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, at 1.
169. Van der Maas Report, supra note 15, at 1701. The 1995 report provides more
detail regarding the circumstances and frequency of non-voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia than either the 1990 or 2001 report. Because the relative frequency of involuntary euthanasia did not change significantly from 1995 to 2001, the 1995 data is probably
still a valid estimate of current medical practice. See Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra
note 15, tbls.1–2.
170. Van der Maas Report, supra note 15, tbl. 4.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1702.
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while in at least 5 percent of all involuntary euthanasia cases, the physician failed to discuss either the patient’s prognosis, the availability of
alternative therapies or palliative care, or the moral propriety of terminating the patient’s life.173 Significantly, the study fails to document how
many, if any, of these physicians faced either professional disciplinary
sanction or criminal investigation.
If the rate of physician self-reporting for voluntary euthanasia, which is
decriminalized, is only 50 percent,174 the physician self-reporting rate for
involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, which remains illegal under
the criminal code, may be similar or greater. Presumably, the official
estimate of 1,000 involuntary euthanasia cases per year may significantly
understate the actual incidence of involuntary euthanasia.
In addition, the 1990 Remmelink Report revealed that slightly less than
5,000 patients were killed by terminal sedation without explicit request.175 Although described as cases of terminal sedation by the report’s
authors, some of these deaths probably represent instances of involuntary
euthanasia.176 Not surprisingly, although subsequent reports provided
aggregated estimates of the number of cases of terminal sedation, the
1995 and 2001 reports do not indicate whether informed consent was
obtained.177 If the actual number of involuntary euthanasia cases in 1990
was closer to 6,000 deaths instead of 1,000, and the relative frequency of
involuntary euthanasia remained constant through 2001, then approximately 5 percent of all deaths in the Netherlands result from physicians

173. Id. tbl. 4.
174. Sheldon, supra note 164.
175. Van der Maas Report, supra note 15, at 669–74.
176. Because the researchers relied on documentation provided by the physicians
themselves, there is no independent corroboration of their classification of individual
cases. SMITH, supra note 13, at 111. A physician who knowingly performs involuntary
euthanasia may simply indicate that the primary purpose of the treatment was to relieve
the patient’s pain, while the secondary or ancillary intention was to perhaps hasten death.
In other words, the government’s classification of marginal cases depends entirely on
how the physician characterizes the treatment. The physician, in turn, has a significant
incentive to classify marginal situations as cases of terminal sedation, which is essentially
unregulated, rather than involuntary euthanasia, which is technically illegal. Of course,
the government’s hair-splitting contradicts the government’s purported goal in legalizing
active euthanasia. According to the government’s own publications, the primary purpose
of euthanasia was to allow physicians to alleviate patient’s pain and suffering. To refuse
to classify cases where a doctor attempts to relieve pain by hastening death as something
other than euthanasia is somewhat disingenuous.
177. Id.
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performing non-consensual euthanasia on unwilling or unknowing patients.178
For several years, Western media sources have provided anecdotal evidence of widespread euthanasia of mentally retarded or physically deformed infants.179 The recent admission by the administrators at Groningen Hospital that they have been performing euthanasia on infants, allegedly with parental consent, lends credence to the earlier reports.180 Following the hospital’s disclosure of the new policy permitting infanticide,
fresh reports have surfaced that physicians who perform euthanasia on
infants engage in “secret deals” with public prosecutors to avoid prosecution.181 Although Dutch physicians claim that approximately fifteen children are killed at birth each year,182 other researchers have claimed that
as many as 8 percent of all infant deaths, corresponding to 80 children
each year, are due to euthanasia.183 Of the minority of such cases that
were reported to local prosecutors, none resulted in a criminal conviction.184
Finally, the authors of the Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report noted that the
proportion of physicians who had performed an act of involuntary euthanasia decreased between 1990 and 2001.185 Despite that decrease, however, 13 percent of physician respondents admitted that they could conceivably engage in the termination of a patient without request.186
D. Other Research Regarding Euthanasia in the Netherlands
A separate and independent study by the Netherlands Institute for
Health Services Research (NIVEL) utilized data from a sample of sixty
general practitioners.187 This trend analysis covered a much broader pe178. Id. The figure of 6,000 deaths includes the official estimate of 1,000 cases of
“ending of life without explicit request” and 5,000 cases of terminal sedation without
request. Since between 120,000 and 140,000 deaths occur each year, roughly 5 percent of
all deaths appear to involve non-consensual killings.
179. E.g., Wesley J. Smith, Now They Want to Euthanize Children in the Netherlands,
WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 13, 2004, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/
Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/616jszlg.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
180. Horsnell, supra note 1, at 13.
181. Traynor, supra note 3, at 3.
182. Id.
183. SMITH, supra note 13, at 61.
184. Traynor, supra note 3, at 3.
185. Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, at 3.
186. Id.
187. R.K. Marquet et al., Twenty Five Years of Requests for Euthanasia and Physician
Assisted Suicide in Dutch General Practice: Trend Analysis, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 201
(2003) [hereinafter NIVEL Report].
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riod, from 1977 through 2001, than the government-sponsored surveys.188 In addition to tracking the overall frequency of euthanasia requests, the trend analysis also traced the reasons that patients made such
requests.189 As such, the study provides a valuable patient-centered complement to the government-sponsored studies, which focused on physician attitudes and practices, not patient concerns.190
Regarding the reasons that patients gave for requesting euthanasia or
PAS, the NIVEL researchers reported that fear of pain decreased in significance from 1979 through 2001, while general deterioration of health
and physical ability rose in importance in the same period.191 The NIVEL
researchers deemed the incidence of dyspnoea (e.g., difficulty with
breathing) and hopelessness statistically insignificant.192 Overall, the
NIVEL researchers concluded that the Dutch approach to active voluntary euthanasia did not increase the risk that individuals would request
euthanasia before all palliative options were exhausted.193 Significantly,
the NIVEL Report only analyzed patient requests for euthanasia, and
therefore did not address questions regarding the frequency or clinical
context of involuntary euthanasia in the Netherlands.
E. Analysis of the Government’s Findings
The government-sponsored studies suffer from one primary conceptual
shortcoming. As the authors of the Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report concede,
all three studies were limited to the experiences and attitudes of physicians, not patients.194 As such, the studies do not provide evidence of either patient views regarding euthanasia and end-of-life treatment decisions or the quality of end-of-life care. Furthermore, the government
studies do not address the vitally important issue of what factors influence an individual patient or doctor to consider euthanasia as a treatment
option. Therefore, the reports contribute little to the substantive analysis
of the merits of the due process requirement of the Netherlands’ euthanasia regulations.
One critic of Dutch euthanasia practice, citing the Van der Maas survey and the Commission Report’s observation that palliative care training, knowledge, and research in the Netherlands lag behind comparable
medical knowledge in other European states, asserts that euthanasia is
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
Id.
See Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, at 5.
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routinely used as an alternative, rather than an infrequent supplement, to
palliative care.195 Similarly, opponents of euthanasia assert that the legalization of euthanasia serves as a disincentive to the Dutch government
to invest in palliative care education and may increase the risk of patients
requesting euthanasia because of undue influence or duress.196
The empirical evidence of euthanasia practice in the Netherlands reveals a number of troubling conclusions. First, the government’s narrow
definition of euthanasia excludes many deaths that could fairly be classified as passive voluntary euthanasia, active voluntary euthanasia, and
active involuntary euthanasia.197 Second, the fact that fewer than half of
all physicians report cases of voluntary euthanasia,198 which has been a
legal requirement of due care since the late 1990s, indicates that the government should not rely on voluntary physician compliance with the
statutory due care requirement. Arguably, the self-reporting requirement
for voluntary euthanasia patients is the least arduous of the due care requirements. Thus, the failure of almost half of all Dutch physicians to
comply with this basic procedural requirement suggests that large numbers of physicians may regularly violate the other requirements of due
care, such as waiting for a patient’s repeated and persistent request for
euthanasia or obtaining a physician consultation prior to performing
euthanasia. Finally, the widespread non-compliance with the reporting
requirement suggests that the government’s purported objective in passing the Termination of Life Act, namely, to promote physician compliance with the legal requirements of due care, has not succeeded.
V. CRITIQUE OF THE DUTCH ATTEMPT TO REGULATE EUTHANASIA
A. Historical Overview of the Moral Debate
The Netherlands’ debate regarding the proper approach to euthanasia
regulation reflects the natural tension between individual mortality, traditionally an intensely personal subject, and government policy, which is
195. KEOWN, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 27, at 281.
196. The Dutch Story: Legalization of Euthanasia, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, May 2, 2001,
at 5 n.14.
197. The studies do not consider terminal sedation or the withholding of life-sustaining
medical treatment to constitute euthanasia. As previously noted, the characterization of
each particular course of treatment as either terminal sedation or active euthanasia is
entirely dependant on how each treating physician chooses to classify the patient encounter. Moreover, physicians possess a strong incentive to classify marginal cases as terminal
sedation, which is unregulated, rather than involuntary euthanasia, which is nominally
illegal. As such, because of the obvious evidentiary concerns, it remains difficult for researchers to draw clear distinctions in many cases.
198. See Sheldon, supra note 164.
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naturally public, open, and impersonal.199 Whether an individual believes
that euthanasia should be outlawed, legalized, or simply unregulated by
the state, the debate invariably touches upon profound personal beliefs
regarding religion, morality, and the sanctity of life.200 Consequently, any
analysis of the Netherlands’ particular approach to euthanasia requires a
brief explanation of the moral principles that underlie the public debate.
Virtually every legal system in history recognized the principle that the
intentional killing of another individual is usually wrong.201 It is significant, however, that the rationale for that principle varies dramatically
depending upon time and place. The general prohibition against murder
may be derived from religious tenets,202 utilitarian practicality,203 or other
philosophical grounds.204 Indeed, humanity’s historical inability to agree
on a universally valid basis for the prohibition against killing underlies
modern societies’ failure to agree on an appropriate approach to euthanasia.205
The euthanasia debate also relates to the question of suicide.206 Although different cultures believed that suicide could be justified in spe199. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 4.
200. Indeed, once the discussion begins regarding life, death, killing, and suicide, a
host of ancillary issues begin to cloud the analysis. The advances in medical technology
of the twentieth century resulted in the ability of physicians to preserve some aspects of
life, for example, a heart and lower brain functions, almost indefinitely. Conversely, advances in the field of genetics, prenatal screening, and abortion techniques allow physicians and patients to fertilize human eggs outside of the natural womb, diagnose genetic
defects, and safely terminate pregnancies. These advances have forced a new generation
of bioethicists to reexamine fundamental definitions of life, humanity, and death. See
generally MCMAHAN, supra note 38 (studying a range of moral and philosophical questions relevant to identity, abortion, euthanasia, and advances in bioethics).
201. For example, one of the earliest written collection of laws, the Code of Hammurabi, criminalized murder. Drafted in Babylonia between 1792 and 1750 B.C.E., the Code
of Hammurabi prohibited, inter alia, private retribution, revenge, and blood feuds. Interestingly, the Code of Hammurabi arguably represents the first legal recognition of the tort
of medical malpractice, inasmuch as the Code established fines for the negligent performance of surgery. See Code of Hammurabi, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA PREMIUM
SERVICE, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=9039076 (last visited Feb. 22,
2006).
202. E.g., Exodus 20:13 (“You shall not murder.”).
203. E.g., PETE SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR
TRADITIONAL ETHICS 220 (1994).
204. See, e.g., MCMAHAN, supra note 38, at 95.
205. As one scholar notes, the moral dilemmas associated with killing and euthanasia
are linked because “[v]oluntary and involuntary euthanasia are both types of planned
killing.” Luke Gormally, Walton, Davies, Boyd and the Legalization of Euthanasia, in
KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 113–15.
206. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 77.
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cific circumstances, the general condemnation of suicide extends back at
least to the early Greek philosophers.207 The Judeo-Christian proscription
of suicide resulted in the criminalization of suicide during the Middle
Ages, and continues to inform most Western societies’ views of, if not
their responses to, suicide.208 Today, few states consider it a felony to
commit suicide, however, many states, including the Netherlands, prohibit laypeople from assisting in a suicide.209
Aside from the general proscriptions of killing and suicide, the historic
prohibition of euthanasia derives from a precept first articulated by the
founder of medical ethics, Hippocrates.210 His Hippocratic Oath, first
articulated in the fourth century B.C.E. and repeated by thousands of
medical school graduates each year around the globe, includes the injunction, “to give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked.”211 Of course,
the Hippocratic Oath is a professional code of ethics, not a rule of law or
belief system. Moreover, the Dutch medical community has apparently
rejected that aspect of the Oath, at least to the extent that the official position of the KNMG is that euthanasia constitutes a legitimate feature of
modern medical practice. However, the Hippocratic Oath and the legacy
of traditional medical ethics continue to inform the international debate
as well as individual practitioners’ attitudes regarding euthanasia.212

207. The Vikings, for example, coveted death in violent battle and allegedly preferred
death by suicide over natural causes. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 78.
The Greek philosopher Plato argued that suicide was cowardly, but could be acceptable if
an individual was particularly immoral. Id. at 78–79. See generally THE LAWS OF PLATO
(Thomas L. Pangle trans., 1988). Plato’s student Aristotle believed that suicide was always morally wrong. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 78 n.6. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, (Terence Irwin trans., 1999). Feudal Japan’s
code of bushido, on the other hand, made seppuku, or ritual suicide, obligatory for the
samurai class in certain circumstances. Seppuku, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA PREMIUM
SERVICE, http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?tocId=937825 (last visited Feb. 22,
2006).
208. See, e.g., MCMAHAN, supra note 38, at 10 (reviewing the approaches of Thomas
Aquinas and Rene Descarte to the problem of the soul, as those approaches relate to
Catholic and other Christian teachings regarding death and killing); see also NEW YORK
STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 81–82 (discussing justifications for euthanasia articulated during the late nineteenth century).
209. See SR arts. 293–94 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES, supra note 72, at 200.
210. SMITH, supra note 13, at 19–20 n.55.
211. See TABERS’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 832 (C.K. Thomas ed., 16th ed.
1989); see also SMITH, supra note 13, at 19–20 n.55.
212. RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, THE RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY: AN ARGUMENT IN
ETHICS, MEDICINE AND LAW 82 (2001).
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Unsurprisingly, most, but not all, belief systems consider involuntary
euthanasia to be always morally unacceptable.213 However, an influential
group of academics and bioethicists argue that involuntary euthanasia
may not only be morally acceptable but actually a moral imperative.214
Like belief systems in favor of voluntary euthanasia, belief systems that
sanction involuntary euthanasia are quite varied. Briefly, some ethicists
argue that spending healthcare resources on comatose or vegetative patients, who lack the capacity to either feel pain or desire life, constitutes a
crime against those individuals who suffer for lack of medical care.215
Others argue that infants, comatose patients, or adults with severe cognitive defects, including elderly patients with advanced Alzheimer’s disease, are not “persons” and that it cannot be morally wrong to kill nonpersons.216 Finally, if euthanasia represents an appropriate clinical response to the problem of unbearable pain and suffering, then it is morally
indefensible to deny that clinical response to infants, comatose patients,
or individuals with severe mental retardation simply because those individuals cannot request euthanasia for themselves.217 Although perhaps
shocking or morally repugnant to some, these theories in favor of involuntary euthanasia are internally consistent and therefore no less logically
sound than belief systems that disavow involuntary euthanasia.
In the end, the relative merits and shortcomings of the various religious, philosophical, and legal arguments relating to death, suicide, and
abortion, could easily fill multiple libraries. However, a few generalities
are common to each argument. First, each religious, philosophical, or
legal argument constitutes a self-defining belief system that may or may
213. MCMAHAN, supra note 38, at 464 (“[I]nvoluntary euthanasia, by contrast [to voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia] does involve a violation of the autonomous will of
the person who is killed or allowed to die, and it is precisely for this reason that it can
never, in practice if not also in principle, be justified.”).
214. The group of academics who support involuntary euthanasia include, among others, Princeton University professor Pete Singer, British academic John Harris, and
Georgetown University professor Tom Beauchamp. SMITH, supra note 13, at 14–17.
215. John Harris, Euthanasia and the Value of Human Life, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED:
ETHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 20 (John Keown ed., 1995) (“The real problem of
euthanasia is the tragedy of the premature and unwanted deaths of the thousands of people in every society who die for want of medical and other resources . . . .”).
216. E.g., SINGER, supra note 200.
217. Richard Fenigsen, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 6 ISSUES L. & MED. 229, 235–
37 (1990) (“Hesitation or refusal [of euthanasia to the newborn, mentally retarded, demented or comatose] would raise doubts whether the advocates of euthanasia are as certain of its benefits as they say.”). The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected this
equal protection argument in Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997). The Dutch
Supreme Court has not, to date, considered the equal protection argument with respect to
the Termination of Life Act.
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not be compatible with competing belief systems.218 Second, the degree
to which an individual adheres to a particular belief system, aside from
environmental or sociological pressures, depends upon an individual’s
intuition.219 Third, all modern legal systems, as well as the vast majority
of modern belief systems, recognize that the intentional killing of another
individual is usually wrong and therefore the practice of euthanasia must
be justified as an exception to the general rule.220 Finally, each belief system answers the questions of why and when euthanasia may or may not
be morally permissible; they do not answer the question of who gets to
decide.
B. Conceptual Approaches to Regulation of Euthanasia
Generally, there are three primary responses to the moral question of
euthanasia. These approaches are the prohibitionist view, the patientautonomy perspective, and the beneficence principle. Each view constitutes a procedural response to the regulation of euthanasia. As such,
these approaches are separate and distinct from the moral, religious, or
philosophical justifications that underlie any individual’s personal beliefs. Instead, these conceptual approaches answer the question, who gets
to decide whether or not to perform euthanasia?
The prohibitionist view considers all forms of euthanasia to be morally
unacceptable. Consequently, prohibitionists believe that active euthanasia, whether voluntary or involuntary, should never be legal.221 This view
forecloses any discussion regarding the merits of specific attempts to
regulate euthanasia, and therefore adds little insight into the discussion
regarding the Netherlands’ euthanasia law.
An alternative approach is the patient-autonomy perspective, in which
the question of euthanasia relates to an individual’s right to selfdetermination, namely, the right to determine, to the fullest extent possible, the circumstances of one’s own death.222 In this view, the propriety
218. E.g., KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 80.
219. In other words, at a certain point, an individual’s acceptance that a moral distinction does or does not exist between active and passive euthanasia, for example, rests on
what the individual intuitively feels. See Ladd, supra note 33, at 166. Admittedly, this
formulation is incredibly unsatisfying; however, the formulation explains why the core
philosophical questions of euthanasia, as well as of life itself, remain unsolved despite
thousands of years of religious and philosophical discourse.
220. E.g., NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 77–78.
221. E.g., Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of PAS: Creating a
Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996).
222. Supporters of euthanasia from the patient’s rights point of view frequently frame
their arguments in terms of the right to die with dignity. HILL & SHIRLEY, supra note 85,
at 7–8.
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of euthanasia is linked to each patient’s individual moral and religious
beliefs.223 Consequently, the decision to permit euthanasia, although
guided by societal standards of conduct and the realities of the medical
situation, must ultimately rest upon the individual patient’s voluntary and
affirmative choice.224 Significantly, the patient-autonomy perspective
accommodates the prohibitionist’s beliefs, inasmuch as the patientautonomy advocate does not accept the validity of involuntary euthanasia. Thus, individuals who believe that euthanasia is morally wrong but
live in a patient-autonomy system may simply choose not to request
euthanasia. A legal regime that strongly adopts patient-autonomy principles may also accommodate the beneficent approach as well. For example, a patient that accepts that the doctor, not the patient, should determine the course of treatment may simply acquiesce to any course of
treatment, including euthanasia, which the doctor recommends.
The third general approach to euthanasia, the beneficence principle,
states that physicians’ primary duty is to cure disease and alleviate suffering.225 In this view, patient self-determination is ancillary, or perhaps
irrelevant, to the primary goal of alleviating suffering.226 Accordingly,
the physician, not the patient, acts as the primary decision maker regarding the proper course of medical treatment.227 Several additional princi223. E.g., COHEN-ALMAGOR, supra note 209, at 82.
224. Patient autonomy may be understood as the manifestation in medical ethics of the
more general principle of self-determination on which most modern legal systems are
based. Thus, the patient autonomy perspective not only underlies the common law doctrine of informed consent, but also has been adopted by the European Convention on
Human Rights. Article 2 of the Convention states, “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a
sentence of a court . . . .” Convention on Human Rights, art. 2, Sept. 3, 1953, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
225. Anthony Fischer, Theological Aspects of Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED:
ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 321 (John Keown ed., 1995).
226. In this respect, a purely beneficent approach to euthanasia regulation is incompatible with the patient autonomy perspective. In an overtly beneficent legal regime, once
a physician decides that euthanasia is the medically appropriate response to a patient’s
condition, the patient’s consent is irrelevant. A less rigid beneficent regime values patient
self-determination, however, when faced with a choice between two contradictory
courses of treatment, the beneficent principle tips the balance in favor of the doctor’s
professional judgment and the standards of accepted medical practice. In other words, in
a mixed regime that emphasizes beneficence over patient autonomy, a practitioner may
take into consideration the patient’s preferences so long as those preferences do not contradict the physician’s considered clinical judgment.
227. The beneficence approach to medical ethics is based upon the ethical principles
first established by Hippocrates and, therefore, traditionally prohibited euthanasia. More
recently, beneficent principles have been used to rationalize both voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. The important feature of the beneficence principle is not whether it per-
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ples spring from the beneficent approach to euthanasia. First, the beneficent approach assumes that physicians always act in the best interests of
their patients.228 In addition, the pro-euthanasia physician who operates
in a beneficent regime accepts the proposition that certain lives are not
worth living and that painless death from euthanasia is more dignified
than painful death from terminal disease. Since physicians, not patients,
are viewed as the most qualified actors to evaluate the relative value of
patients’ lives,229 physicians should be free to perform both voluntary
euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia in an overtly beneficent regime.230

mits or precludes euthanasia, but rather that the physician, not the patient, is the most
appropriate decision maker. Dieter Giesen, Dilemmas at Life’s End: A Comparative Legal Perspective, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 321 (John Keown ed., 1995).
228. The beneficent principle is best summed up by the expression, “the doctor knows
best.” One example of how physicians internalize the beneficent approach to medicine is
the response given by a Dutch euthanasia advocate, Rob Houtepen. Faced with the question as to whether the existing due care provisions protect against involuntary euthanasia,
Dr. Houtepen argued that, although there was a need to improve the notification procedure, if the guidelines are followed, then there is no danger of abuse. Of course, Dr.
Houtepen’s answer missed the point. It did not occur to the doctor that some physicians
might simply prefer to ignore the due care requirements. Dr. Cohen-Almagor’s interviews occurred in 1999, one year before the Dutch Ministry of Health implemented more
rigorous euthanasia notification procedures and three years before the passage of the
Termination of Life Act. See Cohen-Almagor, supra note 47, at 168.
229. SMITH, supra note 13, at 10–19.
230. For example, the bioethicist Roger Dworkin believes that most legal systems’
embrace of patient autonomy principles constitutes more “rhetoric” than “fact.” Roger
Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J. 727, 727–28
(1993). In a pure patient autonomy regime, patients could auction away internal organs to
the highest bidder, agree via contract to pay less for healthcare in return for their waiver
of the right to sue for medical malpractice, and request and receive euthanasia ondemand. Such bioethicists also believe that, since the death of some people, for example,
a beloved father of a large family, causes greater grief than the death of other people, for
example, an anti-social hermit, it is acceptable to measure the value of individual human
lives in relative terms. SMITH, supra note 13, at 18. It remains unclear whether Dworkin
accepts involuntary euthanasia or merely argues for a diminished role for blind adherence
to patient-autonomy principles in euthanasia cases. Pete Singer’s advocacy in favor of
involuntary euthanasia represents a more extreme articulation of the beneficent approach
to euthanasia. See generally SINGER, supra note 194.
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C. Intersection of Dutch Law and the Conceptual Approaches to Regulating Euthanasia
Admittedly, few legal systems fully incorporate either the patientautonomy perspective or the beneficence principle. Rather, most legal
systems attempt to strike a balance between patients’ rights to determine
the course of their own medical care and physicians’ prerogatives to provide care in accordance with their professional medical judgment. The
Dutch approach to euthanasia reflects this internal balancing act. For example, the Termination of Life Act and an accompanying Ministry of
Health, Sports, and Welfare publication assert that the Act’s primary
purpose is to further the goal of protecting patients’ rights and autonomy.231 Likewise, the 1994 Medical Assistance Act232 and the country’s
ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights233 indicate that
the Dutch government is committed to the principle of patient autonomy.
However, ample evidence suggests that beneficence, not patient autonomy, is the primary motivation behind the Dutch approach to euthanasia
regulation.234 For example, only one of the five substantive due care provisions in the Act actually corresponds to the patient’s subjective statements and beliefs.235 The remaining due care provisions address what the
physician’s convictions must be in order to satisfy the requirements of
due care.236 Other Dutch government statements also suggest that allevia-

231. For example, the Dutch government asserts, “Thanks to the new Act, doctors and
terminally ill people know exactly what their rights and obligations are. . . . The voluntary nature of the patient’s request is crucial: euthanasia may only take place at the explicit request of the patient.” NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 1–2.
232. Koster, supra note 83.
233. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953); see also supra text accompanying note 224.
234. See Gunning, supra note 12 (“Many people think that legalizing euthanasia will
make them autonomous. But, in fact, it is the doctor who is made free to do as he thinks
right. In the end, it is not the patient, but the doctor who decides when life should be
ended.”); see also de Vries, supra note 82, at 378 (“[T]he law allows for a medical exception because only doctors are allowed to entertain a request for euthanasia. Another reason for the medical exception stems from the fact that considerations about the request—
specifically whether the patient’s suffering has been hopeless and unbearable—are medical or clinical considerations and considerations upon which the courts must rely.”).
235. “The patient must hold the conviction that there was no other reasonable solution
for the situation he was in.” Termination of Life Act, ch. 2, art. 2 (1)(d).
236. These due care requirements include the “voluntary and well-considered” request
requirement, the “lasting and unbearable” suffering requirement, and the consultation
with another colleague requirement, and the requirement that the physician perform the
euthanasia according to the prevailing standards of acceptable medical practice. For each
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tion of patient suffering, not respect for individual patient autonomy, was
the primary motivator behind the Termination of Life Act.237
Meanwhile, the Dutch Supreme Court’s construction of the noodtoestand principle in the Alkmaar decision represents a strong commitment to physician beneficence.238 The supreme court specifically discounted the legal significance of the patient’s right to self-determination
as the controlling factor in euthanasia cases. That construction indicates
that, from a doctrinal point of view, physician beneficence is more important than patient-autonomy principles. Moreover, the overall history
of the due care provisions, from the original KNMG guidelines through
the Termination of Life Act requirements, indicates that Dutch courts
consistently turn to the medical profession to decide what constitutes
acceptable euthanasia practice. Indeed, current Dutch euthanasia law requires judges to focus the factual inquiry on the physician’s, not the patient’s convictions. The law then proceeds to evaluate the physician’s
convictions according to a standard of conduct developed by the medical
community itself. Thus, the case law since 1984 reveals a marked predilection for the beneficent view, as the alleviation of pain, prevailing standards of medical care, and physicians’ professional judgments are far
more important factors than any individual patient’s right to selfdetermination.239

of these due care provisions, the Act focuses on the physician’s convictions, not the patient’s. Id. ch. 2, art. 2 (1).
237. For example, the government asserts that “[m]ost requests for euthanasia come
from patients who are suffering unbearably with no prospect of improvement and see
death as the only way out.” NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 3. However, as
the NIVEL study indicated, more patients requested euthanasia because of general quality
of life concerns than for fear of pain; fear of pain decreased in significance from 1979
through 2001. Marquet, supra note 178, at 201.
238. The Dutch Supreme Court’s articulation of the noodtoestand principle in the Alkmaar decision was that of the conflict between Article 294 of the Dutch Penal Code, the
article that prohibits the intentional killing of a patient upon the latter’s request, and the
physician’s professional medical duty to alleviate suffering. Belian, supra note 9, at 260.
239. As the Sutorius case indicates, an individual’s claim of being “tired of life” remains legally insufficient to justify euthanasia. Sheldon, supra note 108.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Dutch approach to euthanasia regulation fails because it relies
upon a doctrinal justification for permitting active euthanasia that does
not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Although
the Dutch legal system pays lip service to the principle of patient autonomy, the determinative factor in all euthanasia cases remains the alleviation of pain according to prevailing medical standards.240
The courts have shifted the focus of the legal inquiry away from the
patient’s affirmative and voluntary request for euthanasia and towards
the physician’s professional medical judgment, a self-defining standard
that makes the medical community, not the individual patient or the
Dutch citizenry at large, the ultimate arbiter of euthanasia policy. Moreover, because the majority of the Termination of Life Act’s due care provisions regulate physicians’ beliefs, not the patients’ wishes, the Act in
reality denigrates patients’ interests rather than protects them. In other
words, by relying on the legal mechanism of noodtoestand, and the
Dutch Supreme Court’s formulation of the noodtoestand defense in the
Aklmaar case,241 the Dutch courts have institutionalized a legal slight of
hand.
In the current legal formulation, euthanasia is legally valid because
“[t]he principle of avoiding suffering thus overrides the principle of
autonomy.”242 If that is true, then physicians cannot logically deny the
benefits of euthanasia to mentally challenged, severely disabled, or comatose patients who lack the capacity to make a formal request. The
Dutch medical establishment has already recognized the veracity of that
statement, as indicated by the KNMG’s recent request to the government
for additional involuntary euthanasia guidelines.243 Notice, even the recent infanticide protocols announced by Groningen Academic Hospital
are cloaked in the language of patient autonomy.244 Yet, to the extent that
these cases of involuntary euthanasia involve patients who were never
given a chance to formulate or vocalize their own views with regard to
euthanasia, the Dutch legal system has engaged in a legal fiction.245 Once
240. Belian, supra note 9, at 267–68.
241. Id.
242. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 47, at 173–74.
243. The Dutch Ponder “Mercy Killing” Rules, CNN.COM, Dec. 1, 2004, http://www.
cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/12/01/netherlands.mercykill/index.html.
244. Horsnell, supra note 1, at 13.
245. SMITH, supra note 13, at 94. Of course, because encephalitic infants are born with
only a lower brain stem and no frontal lobes, they cannot, as a matter of medical certainty, ever develop consciousness. Accordingly, the euthanasia of encephalitic infants
can never be explained on patient-autonomy principles.

574

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

the courts recognize the validity of euthanasia requests by proxy, they
will have stripped the concept of informed consent of any meaningful
potency.
In addition, Dutch courts have abrogated their responsibility to serve as
independent and impartial guardians of the interests of patients. The
courts repeatedly defer to the medical judgment of the medical community.246 This deference has been manifest in the Dutch Supreme Court’s
articulation of the standard of care in the Aklmaar case, the courts’ subsequent adoption of the KNMG due care guidelines after 1985, and the
codification of those guidelines in the Termination of Life Act. In addition, the Act itself relies exclusively on physician voluntary compliance
in order to prevent abuse.247
As a practical matter, the empirical evidence indicates that the government’s attempt to prevent non-compliance has failed, as less than half
of all physicians report cases of active voluntary euthanasia,248 which is
legal, while as many as 5 percent of all Dutch deaths appear to result
from the non-consensual killing of patients by their physicians.249 Despite substantial international criticism of Dutch euthanasia practices, the
medical community continues to rationalize any criticism of the Dutch
approach to euthanasia.250
By doctrinally rejecting the personal-autonomy argument in favor of
the prevailing medical standard approach, and relying exclusively on
physician self-regulation to prevent abuse, the courts weaken the only
ethical barrier to non-consensual killings, namely, the right to informed
consent. Since the Dutch legal system purports to recognize the doctrine
of informed consent,251 involuntary euthanasia can never be legally justified because killing an innocent individual who neither requests nor consents to such killing would necessarily infringe upon that individual’s
fundamental right to justice.252
In the end, the balance that the Dutch government has attempted to
strike between patient-autonomy principles and physician beneficence
has not succeeded. Their approach to euthanasia regulation does not protect vulnerable individuals from potential abuse, fails to provide physicians with incentives to comply with the statutory reporting require246. See generally Belian, supra note 9.
247. Termination of Life Act, ch. 2, art. 2.
248. Sheldon, supra note 164.
249. See supra text accompanying note 178.
250. See Hendin, supra note 19, at 238.
251. See Koster, supra note 83.
252. Phillipa Foot, Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO LIFE AND DEATH 33–
35 (John Ladd ed., 1979).
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ments, and as a practical matter, fails to prevent involuntary euthanasia.
Although the Dutch government speaks the language of patient rights,
relief from suffering, and death with dignity, it has created a system in
which physicians, not patients, control the circumstances of death. If
Dutch society believes that involuntary euthanasia is both morally acceptable and socially desirable, then the law should be modified to reflect
that conviction.
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